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A RULE IN SEARCH OF A REASON: AN EMPIRICAL
REEXAMINATION OF eH/MEL AND BELTON

MYRON MOSKOVITZ*

INTRODUCTION

Suppose police officers obtain a warrant to arrest Dan for, say, an
assault that occurred during a fistfight at a neighborhood bar. They go
to Dan's home. His wife lets them in, and they fmd Dan in his
bedroom, in bed. They arrest him, handcuff him behind his back, take
him out of the room, and lock him in a police car. Then one of the
officers searches the nightstand next to the bed, fmding narcotics in the
drawer. Dan is charged with possession of illegal narcotics. His lawyer
moves to suppress the narcotics. She concedes that the arrest was valid
but argues that the narcotics were obtained by an illegal search. The
prosecutor makes no claim that the police had a warrant to search the
premises, that the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of a
crime would be found in the bedroom, that the police searched in order
to protect themselves from weapons, or that Dan or his wife consented
to the search.
Who wins?
Or suppose Dan was arrested (on the same warrant) while driving a
car. He is removed from the car, handcuffed, and locked in a police
car. The officer returns to Dan's car, searches the glove compartment,
and finds narcotics. Dan's lawyer moves to suppress them.
Who wins?
According to many appellate decisions, both motions should be
denied, on the ground that the searches were "incident" to the arrest,
because the nightstand and the glove compartment were within Dan's
reach when he was arrested-though not when the searches took place.
But why?
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable
searches." Snooping through Dan's bedroom furniture and glove
compartment are certainly "searches"-because Dan has a "justifiable"!
"expectation of privacy,,2 in both places. Why does the fact that Dan
was recently arrested near these places make the searches "reasonable"?

* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. Many thanks to the following
professors for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article: Sandy
Kadish, Ron Allen, Dick Frase, George Thomas, Chris Slobogin, Craig Bradley, Bill
Pizzi, Peter Keane, Bob Calhoun, and Charles Weisselberg.
1.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
2.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The stress of the arrest might have caused Dan to reach into nearby
areas for a weapon to attack the police, but that danger evaporated when
Dan was removed from the scene of the arrest. So, why allow the
police to search the area of the arrest after the arrestee is gone?
The source of this problem may be found in one of the most
Significant Fourth Amendment cases ever decided by the United States
Supreme Court-a case well known for its restriction on the authority of
police to search incident to an arrest. The problem lies with Chimel v.

California. 3
I. CHIMEL

Police officers obtained· a· warrant to arrest Chimel for burglarizing
a coin shop.4 No search warrant was issued. s They went to his home to
arrest him.6 His wife let them in, and Chimel· arrived a few minutes
later. 7 The officers arrested him when he "entered the house"presumably near the front door..s The officers then searched "the entire
three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop.,,9 The search of some rooms was "relatively cursory," but
when the officers searched the master bedroom and sewing room, they
asked Chimel' s wife to open drawers and to move items within them. 10
A number of stolen coins were seized in the course of the search of
those rooms. 11
The Supreme Court held that Chimel's motion to suppress the coins
should have been granted. The Court began by quoting the fundamental
principle it had established just a year earlier in Terry v. Ohio: "'[t]he
scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered· its initiation permissible. ,,,12 Applying
this principle, the Court held in Chimel:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

(1968».

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 753.
Id.
See id.

Id. at 754.
[d.
[d.

Id. at 762 (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19
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arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like
rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is
ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area "within his immediate control"construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk
.drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions,
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.
The "adherence to judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth
Amendment requires no less.
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the
facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here
went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him.
There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a
search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.
The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's
conviction cannot stand. 13
This language lays down two rules: a "negative" rule and a
"positive" rule. The "negative" rule establishes where the police may
not search, and the "positive" rule establishes where they may search.
The "negative" rule seems quite sensible. There is no good reason
to allow the police to search areas beyond the arrestee's reach, simply
because he was arrested; such a search is "unreasonable" under the

13.

[d. at 762-63, 768.
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Fourth Amendment. 14 Since the police violated Chimel's rights under
this "negative" rule, the search was illegal; the resulting evidence
should have been suppressed, and the conviction should have been
reversed-which it was. Thus, the "negative" rule was essentially the
"holding" of the case.
The "positive" rule, however, was not essential to the Court's
opmlOn. Arguably, it was mere dicta. The Court might have said,
"there was no justifiable reason for the police to search the master
bedroom and sewing room where the evidence was found. Therefore,
that search was unreasonable. We leave for another day the question of
where the police are allowed to search 'incident to an arrest. '"
Unfortunately, the Court did not say this. Instead, the Court established
a new rule with far-reaching consequences: the police may search "the
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control. ",15
This was a mistake. The Court did not carefully examine whether
this rule was consistent with the Court's own rationale (probably
because the Court was more concerned with establishing its negative
rule).16 The rule was n<;>tconsistent-at least in part.
There are two halves to the "positive" rule: (1) the police may
search "the arrestee's person," and (2) the police may search "the area
within his immediate control." The first half is consistent with the
Court's rationale. The arrestee might have a weapon hidden in his
clothing, and the weapon might be too small (e.g., a razor blade or
small knife) to be detected by a "frisk" (a patdown of the outer
clothing). Even if the arrestee is handcuffed-including behind his
back-he might be able to reach the weapon and use it to attack the
police officers. The weapon and its user will be in close proximity to
the police for an extended period of time: during escort to the police
car, transportation in the police car to the police station, removal from
the car, booking, etc. The weapon might be surreptitiously drawn and
employed against the officers at any of these points because the weapon
14. In a particular case, there might be other reasons to allow such a search.
Indeed, in Chimel, Justice White dissented, arguing that the police had probable cause to
believe that Chimel had stolen property in his house, and that "exigent circumstances"
prevented them from getting a search warrant before Chimel's wife might hide the
evidence. [d. at 773-74 (White, J., dissenting).
15. [d. at 763.
16. In Harris v. United States, the Court validated the search of an entire
apartment incident to an arrest in that apartment. 331 U.S. 145, 148 (1947); cf United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950) (validating the search of an office incident
to the arrest of an employee in that office) (citing Harris, 331 U.S. 145). In Chimel, the
Court spent a good part of its opinion explaining why Harris and Rabinowitz should
have been overruled. See, e.g., Chimel, 752 U.S. at 757-61. For a summary of the
Supreme Court cases leading up to Chimel, see State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947,953 (N.J.
1994).
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goes wherever the arrestee goes. So does evidence (a small amount of
narcotics, perhaps) that might be destroyed en route to a police station.
A search of the arrestee's person for evidence will cause only a small
additional intrusion on his privacy; he is likely to be placed in a jail cell,
at least temporarily, and his jailors are entitled to search him before
jailing him. On the other hand, the danger to the police is high (serious
injury or death) if the arrestee has a weapon. Therefore, the "search
incident to arrest" doctrine should validate a search of the arrestee's
person, even in the absence of information indicating that he, in fact,
has a weapon or evidence on him. This is what the Supreme Court later
held in United States v. Robinson. 17
A search of the area around the arrestee at the time of the arrestthe area within his "wingspan" or "lunge area"-is quite another matter.
That area does not go with him to the police station. If the arrestor can
justify a search of that area, the justification cannot be the same as the
one underlying the person search.
Chimel's justification for a search of that area appears to be based
on two assumptions: (1) that the arrestee might be inclined to reach into
that area for a weapon or evidence, and (2) that the arrestee would be
able to reach into that area. The first assumption might be correct, but
the second assumption is not correct. Because it is incorrect, a whole
body of subsequent law has been built on a false foundation.
I am not a police officer. Nevertheless, from a lay perspective, I
have always been puzzled by this second assumption. If I were a police
officer and had even the slightest fear that the person I just arrested
might reach into a nearby drawer, etc., for a weapon or piece of
evidence, what would I do? Would I allow him to stand there
unrestrained while I searched that area? Of course not. He might attack
me or flee while I was searching. 1 would immediately restrain him and
remove him from the area that might contain the reachable weapon or
evidence. Since I would be taking him to the police station anyway, I
might as well begin that "transportation" process right away. I can
think of exceptions that might occasionally arise (e.g., where the
arrestee is not dressed and needs to reach into a drawer to get some
clothing),18 but this would not be the usual situation. And if in an
unusual case I decided not to restrain him because he did not pose a
17. 414 u.s. 218, 235 (1973).
18. See United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Where
a person in custody asks to be given access to an area, he has no basis to object that the
arresting officers conducted a protective search to secure the area prior to granting his
request. "); see also Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445
F.2d 1238, 1247 (6th Cir. 1971); People v. Jones, 767 P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. 1989).
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threat (e.g., because he was injured, feeble, or disabled), then that very
reason would preclude him from reaching for a weapon or evidence. 19
The Justices who decided Chimel were not police officers either,
yet they also implicitly made an assumption: that the police need to
search the area because the arrestee is usually present and unrestrained
during the search. They cited no studies, expert testimony, or other
evidence to support their assumption. 20
If the Court's assumption is wrong, then the entire foundation for
the "area search incident to arrest" doctrine collapses. If the arrestee is
normally unable to reach into the area around him, then there should be
no general rule allowing the police to search that area after the arresteven if the search is "contemporaneous" with the arrest. If Chimel falls,
then so does a large body of case law that built upon Chimel, and this
case law is very important in the real world. The United States Customs
Service has stated: "By far the most important and most extensively
utilized exception to the search warrant requirement is the search
incident to a lawful arrest. ,,21
Who is right-the Court or me? I have tried to find out, but it has
not been easy.

19. See United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155, 1164 (5th Cir. 1972) (Tuttle,
J., dissenting) (" [T]he agents neither drew their guns nor attempted to shackle appellant
or render him immobile. Plainly the agents themselves must have believed that appellant
was not in a position to grab a weapon or seize destructible evidence. "); see also United
States v. Erwin, 507 F.2d 937, 939 (5th Cir. 1975) ("They cannot allow the arrestee
freedom of movement, and then later use that freedom to justify an exploratory search of
the dwelling. ").
20. Judge Posner has stated, "It is the lack of an empirical footing that is and
always has been the Achilles heel of constitutional law, not the lack of a good
constitutional theory." Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 21 (1998); see also David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional FactFinding ": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword:
Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 90 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) ("The most current and
reliable empirical and social scientific evidence must inform the normative judgments at
the heart of constitutional criminal procedure. ").
21. U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., SPECIAL AGENT HANDBOOK: CHAPTER 42, SEARCH &
SEIZURE 13 (n.d.); see also CITY OF CLEVELAND DEP'T. OF PUB. SAFETY, REGULATIONS
PART IV: SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST 2 (n.d.) ("The search incident to arrest
is one of the earliest recognized exceptions to the written requirement. More searches
are carried out under this exception than any other. H); David E. Aaronson & Rangeley
Wallace, A Reconsideration Of the Founh Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident to
Arrest, 64 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (1975) ("The finding of a 1967 study that more than 90
percent of all searches receiving court consideration were incident to an arrest indicates
that the exception virtually has swallowed the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment. ").
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A. What the Police Do

I do, of course, know some police officers. Some have been
students of mine. When I have asked them the first thing they do after
arresting someone in a home, the answer has been unanimous:
"Handcuff him, and get him out of there." An FBI agent told me the
same thing.
This information is helpful, but not quite a scientific study. I asked
our law librarian to send me some books about law enforcement
techniques, materials used by police training academies, and the like, so
I could read what police officers were instructed to do after an arrest. If
our law school library did not have such materials (it did not), then the
librarian could get them from other libraries. I had no such luck.
How can this be? A nation with thousands of law enforcement
agencies and police officers would seem to be an excellent market for
professional training guides. Someone must produce such materials, and
someone must make money from them. Librarians, who fervently
believe iIi sharing knowledge and know how to find available materials,
should be able to find them if anyone can. Our librarian could get
nothing-not even from libraries likely to have such materials (such as
the library at the California Department of Justice).
The answer, it turns out, is that law enforcement agencies generally
try to keep these materials secret.
Their reason is, I suppose,
reasonable: if crooks learn about police techniques, they might also
learn to avoid or counteract them. Even book publishers will not make
books on police techniques available .to people outside of law
enforcement. 22
I was pretty much stymied-until a colleague23 suggested that I send
requests under "freedom of information" and "public records" laws to
various police agencies. I looked up the California and federal statutes
that deal with this. Both, however, contain exemptions for documents
My experience with
revealing law enforcement techniques. 24
bureaucracies has taught me that if you simply ask for something you
have no right to get, they might send it to you anyway. I decided that if
I sent out enough requests, at least a few might slip through the cracks
in the stone wall I'd been facing so far. All it would cost me was a bit
of stationary, postage, and, perhaps, some copying costs.
22. Even at full price, one publisher refused to sell me its police books.
23. Professor Charles Weisselberg, at Boalt Hall.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 6254(f) (West. Supp.
2002). Other states have similar exemptions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
119.07(3)(d) (West 1996); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(2)(c)-(d) (Anderson
2001).
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I sent out requests.
I wrote to the police departments of
California's larger cities (about thirty), California sheriffs departments
(about fifty), about a dozen federal law enforcement agencies, and some
state and municipal police departments around the country (about thirty).
Here is what I asked for:
I hereby request copies of all public records, writings,
audiotapes, videotapes, and documents that are used to train
law enforcement officers in how to perform a search incident
to the arrest of a suspect. I am more interested in practical
advice given to officers than in advice about the law. For
example, should the officer handcuff the suspect and remove
him from the area (for officer safety) before searching the
area? I plan to use these materials for academic research. 25
From the fall of 2000 through the spring of 2001, I received timely
and courteous responses from most (though not all) recipients. A few,
although not as many as I had expected, invoked a statutory exemption
and gave me nothing. Many gave me training materials about the law of
search and seizure, despite my request for "practical advice" rather than
legal advice. This might have been deliberate-a devious way of
invoking the exemption by giving me harmless material-or perhaps
when they saw a letter from a law professor they incorrectly assumed
that I wanted law. Some sent me training materials that dealt with issues
other than the one I cared about.
Several training officers phoned me to clarify what I wanted, and
our conversations were often very helpful. I explained to them that the
law permitted them to do any number of things during an arrest, and I
wanted to know what they actually did. Many said they had little or
nothing in writing, and that most training on the issues I mentioned was
given orally by training officers. I was skeptical about this at first, but I
was told this by so many independent sources that I came to believe it.
One training officer told me, "the average cop doesn't like to read
much. Give him a book and he'll put it on a shelf. They like to learn by
listening to more experienced officers." What about the interrogation
manuals that the Supreme Court assumed in Miranda v. Arizona 26 were
generally used by the police? I was told: "Those were used by
detectives, who do read. They are specialists, not beat cops, who are
generalists and not academically inclined, usually."

25. Letter from Myron Moskovitz, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University,
to California Chiefs of Police (Sept. 18, 2000) (on file with author).
26. 384 U.S. 436, 448-55 (1966).
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A few departments did give me useful information, both orally and
in writing. My strategy worked, in a sense. My hit rate was small, but
by sending out a lot of letters, I received enough information to
conclude that, in general, police officers are taught to handcuff an
arrestee (preferably behind his back) before searching the area around
him. Here is a sampling of the replies I received:
•
"Handcuff the arrestee, regardless of the charge, hands
behind the back, always. Apply handcuffs properly and not
overly-tight. Always double-lock handcuffs . . . . Get the
arrestee away from the scene as soon as possible. ,,27
•
"An officer making an arrest while in a duty status shall:
(A) Identify himself/herself as a police officer in a clear and
understandable voice . . . (B) Advise the person that he/she is
being arrested. The arrestee shall also be advised of the
reason for the arrest as soon as possible. (C) Handcuff the
arrestee as specified in General Order 3610 'Handcuffs/Flexicuffs. (D) Search the arrestee and the immediate area (within
legal constraints) for evidence, weapons, or contraband. ,,28
•
"Never allow a subject to reach into a drawer, closet,
cupboard, etc., to produce valuables. ,,29
•
"Thoroughly search the suspect after· applying the
handcuffs. ,,30
•
"It is much safer to search a handcuffed prisoner. After
the handcuffs have been applied whether from a standing,
kneeling or prone position the person can be searched. ,,31
•
"A search is conducted after handcuffmg an individual
and the application of the double locking device. A search
should not be initiated in arrest situations until the individual is
handcuffed and incapacitated as much as possible. There are
occasions when a search will be conducted without the use of

27. MD. POLICE & CORR. TRAINING COMM'N TRAINING UNIT 34: ARREST
PROCEDURES 9 (rev. Dee. 13, 1999).
28. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NAT'L PARK SERVICE, U.S. PARK POLICE,
GENERAL ORDER 2103.04: ARREST PROCEDURES (as revised on Sept. 30, 1999). Note
that the search takes place after the arrestee has been handcuffed. See id.
29. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., AGENCY REGULATION
§ 6653.3: SEARCH PROCEDURES (n.d.).
30. BOSTON POLICE DEP'T, RULES AND PROCEDURES: RULE 315, SEC. 6 (n.d.).
3l. BOSTON POLICE ACAD., TRAINING BULLETIN 26-89: SEARCHING PRISONERS
(n.d.).
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cuffs such as consent searches but, generally the individual is
cuffed and double-locked and then searched.,,32
•
"An uncuffed or unrestrained person could launch an
attack on the officer during a search of that person. Thus to
minimize what could be a potentially deadly situation, the
subject is cuffed or restrained before searching. ,,33
•
"Always handcuff prior to searching. ,,34

Some of my correspondents noted that officers in the field must
have the discretion to depart from these general rules when necessary.
One stated:
The Sheriff s Office wants its officers to be independent
thinkers and evaluate each situation independently, and not
respond like robots following pre-printed commands. Thus,
the enclosed materials may not contain the level of detail that
you seek. To further the example proposed in your letter,
each officer is given the freedom to independently decide if his
or her safety demands that a suspect be handcuffed and
removed, before conducting a search, depending upon the
circumstances presented at the actual crime scene. The
Sheriff's Office has found that such a policy allows it to better
serve the public, both victim and suspect. 35
Some police departments appear to pay close attention to the

rationale used by Chimel: if the arrestee has been incapacitated, any
search of the area around him is not justified. They understand the rule
that emanated from Chimel (the officers may search the area even after
the arrestee has been incapacitated or even removed), but they don't
really believe in it. As one training officer told me, "if an officer
removes the suspect from the. area of arrest, the officer should get a
32. BALT. COUNTY POLICE DEP'T, EMPLOYMENT & BASIC TRAINING DIV.,
LESSON PLAN: SELF DEFENSE TACTICS, SEARCHING AND PAT DOWNS 1 (2000).
33. Mo. P.O.S.T. COMM'N, TRAINING MATERIALS 5 (n.d.) (provided by the
Kansas City Police Department).
34. ILL. STATE POLICE ACAD., CONTROL AND ARREST TACTICS: LECTURE
OUTLINE 71 (Mar. 1999).
35. Letter from Geoffrey S. Allen, Deputy County Counsel, Solano County,
Cal., to Myron Moskovitz (Sept. 8, 2000) (on file with author). An Oakland,
California, training officer said that he does not always remove the arrestee from the
area of arrest, because the arrestee might say "that's mine" or the like when evidence is
uncovered during a search of the area. Id. "It all depends on how many people are
around, how many officers are present, and how big and potentially dangerous the
arrestee is." Telephone Interview with Sgt. J. Israel, Oakland Police Dep't (Aug. 21,
2000).
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search warrant before searching the area within the guy's wing span,
because otherwise [the] search does not seem justified. ,,36
This sampling cannot compare, of course, with a systematic survey
of materials used by all police agencies in America. I would love to see
that done, but such a task will have to be performed by someone with
access to privileged documents far superior than my very limited
"outsider's" access. (Note, however, that even a complete study of
such documents might not capture the full flavor of the information
transmitted orally in a largely oral police culture.)
Yet two features of my sampling are notable.
First, the materials and oral information I received were more
important for what they did not say than for what they did say. Not one
regulation, training bulletin, or other piece of information indicated that
officers were directed or advised to do, as a general practice, what the
Court in Chimel assumed they would: allow the arrestee to stand
unrestrained where he was when arrested while the officers conduct a
search of the area around him. The reason for this is obvious. As one
department put it, "[t]he safety of officers, citizens, and suspects shall
be of primary consideration whenever entries, searches, or seizures are
made or planned. ,,37
Second, while Chimel;s factual assumptions were based on no
survey, no sample, and no evidence-nothing but the misguided intuition
of a group of jurists-my sampling, even with its shortcomings, is better
36. Telephone Interview with Off. M. Echeverria, Kern County, Cal. Sheriffs
Dep't (Aug. 28, 2000). Connecticut's Dep't of Public Safety Regulation 19.1.9(b) also
provides that a search incident to arrest gives a trooper "authority to search an arrested
person and any thing under his or her immediate control without a search warrant" and
that ~[t]his exception is based upon the need for a trooper to prevent destruction of
evidence 'and to seize weapons and things which may aid an escape or which the suspect
may use to endanger the trooper." See also ARK. STATE POLICE, FIELD OPERATIONS
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL § 3.250: SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST/PROTECTIVE
SWEEP, which provides: "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to conduct a limited search in order to remove any weapons that might be used to
resist arrest, effect an escape or cause injury to the officer or others. It is likewise
reasonable for the officer to conduct a limited search for evidence for the purpose of
preventing its concealment or destruction. It is important that the Arkansas State Police
Officer recognizes that the scope of the search authorized by this rule is substantially
limited." (emphasis added). The training officer for the Massachusetts State Police
noted that Massachusetts law is more restrictive than Chimel. He said: "I tell my
officers that after the guy is arrested and removed from the place of arrest, do not go
back in and search based on the search incident to arrest rule. I tell them to search
within the lunge area only if he is unrestrained in order to retrieve personal belongings
to take with him." Telephone Interview with Sgt. P. Didomenica, Mass. State Police
(Dec. 14, 2000).
37. SACRAMENTO, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, SEARCH MANUAL: RM 526.01, at ii
(n.d.).
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than that. I find it troubling that courts have built up a large body of
law regulating professional police officers without seeking information
about what those officers actually do in the field. This is not always the
case, of course. In Miranda, the Court carefully examined books that
instruct officers on interrogation methods and then formulated rules
designed to deal with those methods. 38 Similar efforts should be made
when dealing with search and seizure issues, even though it might be
more difficult to understand a disparate oral culture than a smaller, more
concentrated group that relies on written materials. 39
The Chimel Court reasoned that the scope of a search incident to
arrest must be determined by those purposes that justify such a search in
the first place. As this warrantless search is justified only by the need to
prevent the arrestee from reaching weapons or evidence, the scope is
therefore limited to those areas accessible to the arrestee. This makes
sense, but the Court's application of this reasoning does not. While the
Court correctly held that the clothing the arrestee is wearing is
accessible to him, the Court incorrectly held that the area around him at
the time of arrest is usually accessible to him. In sum, Chimel's positive
rule was inconsistent with the Court's own rationale.
Chimel's positive rule is especially hard to justify when the search
takes place in a home. When applying other search doctrines, the
Supreme Court has been very protective of the privacy of the home. In
Vale v. Louisiana,40 for example, police officers obtained warrants for
Vale's arrest, saw him appear to complete a drug transaction in front of
his home, and arrested him on the front steps of his home. 41 As they
were leading him away, they encountered Vale's mother and brother
38. 384 U.S. at 442-45.
39. How maya court obtain and evaluate scientific evidence when formulating
rules of law (as contrasted with resolving individual cases)? Through amicus briefs? Its
own research? Trial-like procedures? A tough question, but beyond the scope of this
Article. Others, however, have addressed it. See, for example, James R. Acker, Social
Science in Supreme Coun Criminal Cases and Briefs, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 26
(1990), where the author noted "the absence of formal procedures to assist the Court in
locating or evaluating social science and other social fact information." He continued:
Legal fact-finding procedures have developed almost exclusively for use in
trial courts, to help decide the historical, adjudicative facts that are specific
to individual parties and cases. Consequently, the briefs filed with the Court
may be the only practical way of calling social science findings to the
justices' attention and helping to apprise them of the studies' weaknesses and
limitations.
ld.; see also supra note 20. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 477 (1986); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1988).
40. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
41. ld. at 32.

Empirical Reexamination of Chimel

2002:657

669

about to enter the house. 42 They then searched the house, finding
narcotics. 43 The Court assumed that the police had probable cause to
search the house, but held that a home may not be searched without a
search warrant or "exigent circumstances" that prevent the police from
obtaining and returning with a warrant in time to prevent destruction of
evidence. 44 The Court held that the possibility that Vale's mother or
brother (who saw Vale being led away) would destroy evidence was not
sufficiently "exigent," because the police could have obtained a search
warrant when they obtained the arrest warrant. 45 In his dissent,
however, Justice Black noted that the arrest warrant was issued not
because of any present misconduct by Vale, but because the bond on a
prior narcotics charge had been increased. 46 The majority did not feel
this was sufficient because "only in a 'few specifically established and
well-delineated' situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling
withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though the authorities have
probable cause to conduct it. ,,47 If, however, the police have probable
cause to believe there is evidence not in a home but in an automobile,
they may search the car (including the glove compartment and the trunk)
and all containers (purses, briefcases, etc.) in the car-with no need for
either a search warrant or exigent circumstances. 48
Chimel's positive rule is very difficult to reconcile with Vale's very
protective attitude towards the privacy of the home. It seems strange
that if Vale had been arrested a few feet away-slightly inside the house
instead of slightly outside-Chimel's positive rule would have allowed
the police to lead him away, then return and search that part of the
house that Vale could have reached from the place of arrest, with no
search warrant and no exigent circumstances. So much for the sanctity
of the home!
Other examples of the Court's concern for the privacy of the home
abound. The Court has held that, while the police need neither an arrest
warrant nor exigent circumstances to arrest someone in a public place,49
they need one or the other to forcibly enter a home to arrest. 50 And
while a police dog does not commit a "search" of luggage at an airport

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
U.S. 798
49.
50.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 33.

at 34.
at 35.
at 40 (Black, 1., dissenting).
at 34 (citation omitted).
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456
(1982).
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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by sniffing it,51 an officer's lifting of a turntable to see its serial number
is a "search" where this occurs in a home,52 and use of a thermal imager
to detect heat emanating from a home is a "search. ,,53 A forcible entry
into a home is "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment unless the
police first "knock and announce" their presence and authority (absent
exigent circumstances),54 though there is no requirement that they knock
and announce before entering a car. Use of a beeper installed in a drum
of chloroform to track the whereabouts of an automobile on a public
road is not an intrusion on a "justifiable expectation of privacy, ,,55 but
use of such a beeper to track the movements of the container in a house
is such an intrusion. 56 It is difficult to reconcile these cases with
Chimel's "positive" rule.
B. Robinson

Chimelled to United States v. Robinson,57 which involved a Search
of the arrestee himself rather than the area around him. 58 District of
Columbia police officers arrested Robinson for driving on a revoked
license. 59 Officer Jenks patted Robinson down, feeling an object in his
breast pocket. 60 Jenks removed the object-"a 'crumpled up cigarette
package'" -opened the package, and found heroin. 61
The Court held that each intrusion (the patdown, the reaching into
the pocket, and the looking into the cigarette package) was justified by
the search incident to arrest doctrine. 62 The Court noted "the extended
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station. ,,63
Justice Marshall dissented. He agreed that the patdown was
justified by the need to protect the officers from attack with a small
weapon while transporting Robinson to the police station, and that the
reach into the pocket might be justified by a similar rationale, but he felt

51. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
52. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
53. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
54. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); see also Richards v. Wisconsin,
520 U.S. 385 (1997).
55. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
56. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
57. 414 U.S. 218; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
58. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 223.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 236.
63. Id. at 234-35.
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that the look into the package was not justified. 64 Applying Chimel's
rationale for a search incident to arrest, Justice. Marshall found no
justification for this last search, because Jenks had possession of the
package and could keep it from Robinson.6s
The majority disagreed with this "case-by-case" approach, ruling
that the police need a "bright line" rule that permits them to search
everything on the arrestee incident to the arrest:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search
the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a
quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of
each step in the search. The authority to search the person
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need
to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based
on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to
the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of
the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and
we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a
"reasonable" search under that Amendment. 66

64. [d. at 250-55.
65. [d. at 255-56.
66. [d. at 235. My sampling indicates that the police have their own "bright
line" rule for how to prevent an arrestee from attacking them during a search: handcuff
him behind his back:
•
Cincinnati Police Academy's ROLL CALL TRAINING: SCENARIO
NUMBER 2000-78 (n.d.) states: "If the person is being placed under arrest
handcuff first then search. "
•
California's Tuolumne County Sheriffs Department states: "For
officer safety reasons the recruits are trained to handcuff all arrestees that are
taken into custody and then conduct their search when their 'back-up'
arrives. " Letter from Lt. James L. Earll to Myron Moskovitz (Aug. 31,
2000) (on file with author). Another training officer told me that "searching
the suspect before handcuffing him is a good way to get killed." Telephone
Interview with Off. G. Powell, Sacramento Police Dep't (Aug. 28, 2000).
•
California's Sonoma County Sheriffs Department guideline, H-2
HANDCUFFING OF PRISONERS (n.d.), provides: "Never handcuff in the front,
unless extraordinary circumstanccs occur."
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Unlike some others,67 I have no serious quarrel with the result in
Robinson. I suppose (though I have no studies to back me up) that in a
great majority of cases, there is a possibility that the arrestee has a small
weapon or evidence of a crime in the clothes he is wearing, and it might
be possible for even a handcuffed arrestee to move his hands a short
distance to his clothes to reach such an item. He has plenty of time to
try, during his transportation to the police station, and if he were to
succeed in obtaining a weapon, he could do a lot of damage when the
police unlock the cuffs (if not before). Using a bright line here does not
cost much in terms of privacy, because (as Justice Powell opined) even
those few arrestees who are unlikely to be carrying a weapon or
evidence do not have much privacy in either their persons or their
belongings after they are arrested. 68 The search of the cigarette pack
after it was taken from Robinson is a bit more troubling, but I believe
that might be justified by the rationale of cases upholding inventory
searches of automobiles and objects found in such inventory searches. 69
Even if Officer Jenks retained custody of the cigarette pack, he needed
to search it to avoid later claims that he stole something from it (and,
conceivably, to protect himself from any dangerous object that might be
in the pack). While this notion might seem strained as to a crumpled
cigarette pack, it seems sensible when applied to the usual "containers"
that might be found in the clothing of an arrestee, e.g., a wallet, a coin
purse, etc.
But the Court's assertion that the police need a "bright line" led to
its most troubling extension of the search incident to arrest doctrine:
New York v. Belton. 70

67. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the
Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 841. CRlM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430-36 (1993);
see also Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
PITI. L. REV. 227, 258 (1984):
For a person under arrest to attack an armed officer with a safety pin or
razor blade would be madness, and I am not persuaded that law enforcement
officers need worry a great deal about the danger. Moreover, when an
officer does remain apprehensive after a careful frisk, he can handcuff an
arrestee and lock him in the sealed rear seat of a patrol car.
68. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237 ("[A]n individual lawfully subjected to a
custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his
person. H).
69. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-76 (1976). Later,
however, tbe Court held that an inventory search is permitted only if the officer acts
pursuant to a police department policy allowing such searches. Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1,4-5 (1990).
70. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

2002:657

Empirical Reexamination of Chimel

673

C. Belton
Belton involved a search of an arrestee's car. 7 ! Trooper Nicot
stopped a car for speeding.72 While checking the driver's license and
registration, Nicot smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope marked
"Supergold" on the floor of the car. 73 He ord~red the driver and three
passengers (including Belton) out of the car and placed them on the
Thruway. 74 He arrested them for possession of marijuana, patted them
down, and separated them from each other. 75 He then opened the
envelope-finding marijuana-and searched the passenger compartment,
finding cocaine in the pocket of a black leather jacket on the back seat. 76
The jacket (and, presumably, the cocaine) belonged to Belton, who
moved to suppress the cocaine. 77 The Court held that the search of the
jacket was incident to the arrest and therefore valid. 78
In dissent, Justice Brennan saw this holding as a radical departure
from the principles of Chimel: "When the arrest has been consummated
and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the justifications underlying
Chimel's limited exception to the warrant requirement cease to apply: at
that point there is no possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or
contraband. ,,79
The majority, however, purported to adhere to Chimel's rationale.
Indeed, the majority insisted that "[o]ur holding today. . .. in no way
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial
arrests. ,,80 But the majority asserted that "[a] single familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests
involved in the specific circumstances they confront. ,,8! And what

Id. at 456.
See id. at 455.
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 465-66; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 15 (1977):
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal
property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their
exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might
gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search
of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.
80. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
81. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979».

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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"single familiar standard" should apply where the police arrest an
automobile driver? Here is the Court's answer:
When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled
principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot
know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a
policeman know the scope of his authority. While the Chimel
case established that a search incident to an arrest may not
stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the
arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of "the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee" when that area
arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee
is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the
generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow
compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in
fact generally, even if not inevitably, within "the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary ite[m]." In order to establish the workable rule
this category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of
the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that
generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 82
Is it in fact true that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass
of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]",?83 I don't think
so. No sensible police officer will allow an arrestee to remain within
reach of any such area-he'll get the arrestee out of the car
immediately.84
82. Id. at 459-60 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 460.
84. See Alschuler, supra note 67, at 274:
If any bright line rule had been necessary to resolve the issue in Belton, it
would have been the opposite of the rule that the Court announced. Indeed,
the claim that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment . . . are ... generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
ite[m)'" was almost as farfetched as the proposition that evidence might have
been destroyed or a weapon secured on the facts of Belton itself. It is
difficult to search an automobile while its occupants remain inside. An
officer who attempts this task constantly must ask the occupants to slide over
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The Court says that its "generalization" is "suggested" by "our
reading of the cases. ,,85 But will any assortment of decided appellate
cases give a fair sampling of how police operate on a day-to-day basis?
The Court might have been better served by finding some means of
determining what really happens when the police arrest the driver of an
automobile.
My inquiries to various police departments produced some replies
that bear on this question:
•
"Vehicle searches account for a large number of arrests
and can be planned and done systematically. Safety issues
shall be the first priority. A vehicle search shall not be done
until all occupants of the vehicle have been secured. ,,86
•
"All occupants should be removed from a vehicle before
searching it and they should not be permitted to stand near the
vehicle while it is being searched. ,,87
•
"With backup on the scene, remove all occupants from
the vehicle before you put any part of your body into the car.
(1) To conduct a proper search, you will have to put yourself
in awkward positions. (2) Your sidearm may be exposed and
your attention will be focused on the search of the vehicle. (3)
Your defensive movements may be limited. ,,88

and move their feet. Accordingly, the occupants almost invariably are
removed before an automobile is searched; and once they have been
removed, there is no longer much chance .that they can secure weapons from
the automobile or destroy evidence there.
85. Professor LaFave disagreed with the majority's assertion of what "the cases"
revealed:
Any survey of the relevant cases will indicate a number of commonplace
events which would put the passenger compartment beyond the arrestee's
control-immediate removal of him to a patrol car or some other place away
from his own vehicle, handcuffing the arrestee, closure of the vehicle, and
restraint of the arrestee by several officers, among others.
Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. Pm. L. REv. 307, 329 (1982) (footnotes omitted); see
also David S. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis
of New York v. Belton, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 226-29, 244-47 (1984) (summarizing
facts of cases relied on by Belton).
86. SACRAMENTO, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 37, at 28.
87. MD. POLICE & CaRR. TRAINING COMM'N TRAINING UNIT 34, supra note 27,
at 22.
88. N.C. DEP'T OF CRIME CONTROL & PuB. SAFETY, BASIC LAW ENFORCEMENT
TRAINING: TECHNIQUES OF TRAFFIC LAw ENFORCEMENT 37.
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•
"(a) Search the driver and occupants first. (b) Remove all
occupants while the search is being conducted. ,,89
•
(1) "conduct a professional stop"; (2) "secure the scene,
prevent interference from witnesses"; etc. (3) "remove the
subject(s) from the vehicle"; (4) "request back-up if not·
already present"; (5) "direct the driver out of the vehicle first
and secure him," "[h]andcuff and search only if justifiable";
(6) "[d]o not place anyone in your patrol car if not
handcuffed"; and (7) "conduct a systematic search of the
vehicle-consent or search warrant. ,,90
•
"In removing one or more suspects from the suspect
vehicle, the primary officer orders the suspects from the
suspect vehicle, searches and handcuffs them, and secures
them in the patrol car." The last item in the sequence of
prescribed events is "Search the suspect's vehicle. ,,91
•
"(a) Never search an occupied vehicle. (b) At night turn
off your headlights, turn on your interior lights and turn your
lighted spotlight toward suspect vehicle so that it illuminates
the back seat of same. (c) With multiple suspects, wait for
backup; when practical, do so with lone drivers. (d) Ask
occupants to step to the curb, where they can be searched. (e)
Group occupants and seat them on the curb. (t) Try to get
them to spread their legs and place their palms on the
pavement as a further precaution. (g) While you or backup
officers conduct a search of the vehicle, the other officer
maintains surveillance over these individuals. ,,92

Not a single respondent said or even suggested that a police officer
should search a vehicle while the arrestee is in the vehicle or unsecured.
Thus, it appears that Belton's "generalization that articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within the 'area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary ite[m]' ,,93 is-at least in general-false.
The Court in Belton went even further: "It follows from this
conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any
89. MICH. STATE POLICE, TRAINING DIV., ARRESTING, HANDCUFFING,
SEARCHING, AND TRANSPORTING PRISONERS 93 (emphasis omitted) (n.d.).
90. N.M. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY TRAINING CTR., VEHICLE SEARCH TECHNIQUES:
BLOCK 7.2.3 (n.d.).
91. OAKLAND, CAL. POLICE DEP'T, TRAINING BULLETIN III-B.2 (Dec. 10, 1996).
92. MISSOURI P.O.S.T. COMM'N, REGULATIONS, supra note 33, at 11.
93. 453 U.S. at 460.
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containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it
be within his reach. ,,94 This second generalization is even more
inconsistent with what police officers actually do in the field. Because
they are instructed to remove and secure the arrestee before searching
the vehicle, it is highly unlikely (if not impossible) that an arrestee
would be able to remove his handcuffs, escape from a police car and/or
surveillance by a cover officer, run to the vehicle, enter it or reach into
it, open a container, and remove a weapon or item of evidence-all
before an officer could intervene and stop him. And yet this strange
scenario would have to be the norm for Belton to mesh with Chimel's
rationales for a search incident to arrest.
The problem can be traced back to the flaw in Chimel itself.
Chimel's positive rule-allowing the police to search the area around the
arrestee-did not square with Chimel's own rationale, because a police
officer who fears a reach for a weapon or evidence will incapacitate the
arrestee. The Court in Belton could have corrected this mistake,
disapproving the Chimel dicta. If the Court did this, it could not have
extended the search incident to arrest doctrine to car searches, because
officers do not search cars while the arrestee can reach into the car. But
the Court did not disapprove (or even reexamine) the Chimel dicta. So
the Belton Court confronted the question of how Chimel applies to this
new situation: car searches. The Court answered it by ignoring
Chimel's rationale (the police may search in order to protect themselves
from the arrestee and prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence),
even though it said it was basing its decision on Chimel's rationale.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton argued that the majority strayed
from Chimel, but he too overlooked Chimel's fundamental flaw.
Chimel's positive .rule was inconsistent with its rationale, though
Belton's rule was even more inconsistent. 95
94. Id.
95. LaFave, supra note 85, at 330:
Indeed, it is fair to say that applying the traditional search-incident-to-arrest
rule, which would allow search of that area "from which [the arrestee] might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," is easier in
automobile cases than in most other circumstances because the police can,
and typically do, immediately remove the arrestee from the vehicle. Once
that has been done, it is not difficult to take another step, such as moving
him farther from the car, handcuffing him, or closing the car door, thus
ensuring the nonexistence of circumstances in which the arrestee's "control"
of the car is in doubt. In other words, the "difficulty" and "disarray" the
Belton majority alluded to has been more a product of the police seeing how
much they could get away with (by not following the just-mentioned
procedures) than of their being confronted with inherently ambiguous
situations .
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When a rule is not supported by its own rationale, this can lead to
some very peculiar subsidiary rules.
One example can be found in a footnote in Belton: "Our holding
encompasses only the interior of the passenger compartment of an
automobile and does not encompass the trunk. ,,96 The Court did not
give any reason for this distinction. Apparently, the Court did pretty
much what Chimel implied: place the arrestee exactly where he was
when he was arrested, draw a circle around him with his "wingspan" or
"lunge area" as the radius, and allow the police to search within that
area. If the suspect was arrested while in the car, he could then reach or
lunge into any area of the passenger compartment, but could not reach
the trunk. This is roughly true, of course, but why it should be relevant
is a mystery, because when the search takes place, the arrestee will be
unable to reach either the passenger compartment or the trunk.
Nevertheless, the Court seems to adopt a judicial fiction-hypothetically
placing the arrestee back in the car in order to determine the permissible
scope of the search.
The Belton Court also added a supplement to this fiction: the officer
may search the passenger compartment not only when the suspect was
arrested while in the car, but also when the arrestee was a "recent
occupant" of the car-so long as the search is "contemporaneous" with
the arrest (which, of course, will almost always be after the arrest).
This supplement extends the rule even farther from its rationale, because
a "recent occupant" might be even further away from the car at the time
of the search-or even at the time of the arrest! Why did the Court do
this? No explanation is given, but perhaps the Court felt that this
expansion of the rule would help furnish "a single familiar standard."
However, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, the vagueness of the
word "recent" detracts considerably from the sureness of the rule. 97
The "recent occupant" expansion might have been essential to the
Court's holding that Trooper Nicot's search of Belton's jacket was
96. 453 U.S. at 461 nA.
97. Id. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless search of a car may
take place even though the suspect was arrested outside the car, it does not
indicate how long after the suspect's arrest that search may validly be
conducted. Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if
conducted five minutes after the suspect left his car? Thirty minutes? Three
hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in close proximity to
the car when the search is conducted?
As might have been expected, lower court decisions seeking the extent of (and rationale
for) the "recent occupant" doctrine have been confused and inconsistent. See infra notes
159-69. The Supreme Court showed some interest in resolving this issue, but thus far
has failed to do so. See Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 776 (2001) (dismissing a
case in which it had previously granted certiorari for lack of jurisdiction).
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incident to the arrest, because it is not clear where Belton and the other
men were when they were arrested. The Court explained that after
Nicot smelled the burnt marijuana and saw the envelope, "[h]e therefore
directed the men to get out of the car, and placed them under arrest for
the unlawful possession of marihuana. ,,98 Were they in the car or out of
the car at the moment of arrest?99 As they were at least "recent
occupants," it did not matter, under the Court's new rule.
Why did the Court find it necessary to establish a "single, familiar
standard"-a "bright line"-here? Most Fourth Amendment issues are
resolved by general standards that are not at all "bright": the police need
"probable cause" to arrest,l00 they may search a home without a warrant
only with "exigent circumstances," consent to search must be
"voluntary," the police may conduct a Terry stop only with "reasonable
suspicion. "
None of these standards is "bright." Is there anything peculiar
about an arrest in or near an automobile that gives rise to a greater need
for a bright line? Once the arrestee is restrained and removed from the
car-as he will be, almost every time-there is no urgency that prevents
the officer from going through the same thought process he must go
through in other search or seizure situations. Indeed, one would think
that the fleeting nature of a Terry stop would make a bright line even
more useful there, but the Court has never imposed one. Only on a
case-by-case basis has the Court examined whether the officer had
"reasonable suspicion" for a stop.

98. Belton, 453 U.S. at 456.
99. The New York Court of Appeals said that the men had already been taken
outside the car before they were arrested: "After the marihuana was found, the
individuals, still standing outside the car, were placed under arrest." People v. Belton,
407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1980), quoted in Belton, 453 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan felt the "bright line" was fuzzy for additional reasons:
Even assuming today's rule is limited to searches of the "interior" of carsan assumption not demanded by logic-what is meant by "interior"? Does it
include locked glove compartments, the interior of door panels, or the area
under the floorboards? Are special rules necessary for station wagons and
hatchbacks, where the luggage compartment may be reached through the
interior, or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the driver's
compartment from the rest of the ear? Are the only containers that may be
searched those that are large enough to be "capable of holding another
object"? Or does the new rule apply to any container, even if it "could hold
neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect
was arrested"? The Court does not give the police any "bright-line" answers
to these questions.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
100. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) ("[p]robable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard. ").
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In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,101 the Court expressly rejected a
defense proposal for a "bright line" test (no valid consent if the officer
did not advise the suspect of his right not to consent) for the
voluntariness of consent, preferring a case-by-case examination of
voluntariness. 102 There are no bright lines defining "probable cause" to
arrest or search or the "justifiable expectation of privacy" whose
intrusion creates a "search" in the first place. 103 What, if anything,
makes the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine different? As Professor
LaFave notes, "it is necessary for courts to resist the temptation to draw
new, supposedly 'bright,' lines when in fact existing doctrine is not
causing serious problems in day-to-day practice. ,,104
If a bright line is needed in the Belton situation, the following rule
would seem to be at least as bright as the one adopted by the Court:
"The police may search an automobile incident to an arrest only in
extraordinary circumstances (for example, where an injured or disabled
arrestee cannot be removed from the automobile immediately after the
arrest lOS or where the arrestor needs to reach into the car in order to
secure it). 106 They may then search the area within reach of the
arrestee." This gives the police the guidance they need without
undermining the rationale of Chimel, and it ensures that the police may
use other doctrines (the automobile exception, consent, the inventory
search, etc.) to search the car when appropriate.
Ironically, none of this was necessary. The Court could have used
another doctrine to justify Trooper Nicot's search: the so-called
"automobile" exception. 107 The "Carroll" doctrine allowed police to
search an automobile when they had probable cause to believe there is
evidence in an automobile-even without proof that "exigent
circumstances" prevented them from obtaining a search warrant before
the evidence might be removed or destroyed. During the term following
101. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
102. [d. at 248-49.
103. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
104. LaFave, supra note 85, at 333. See generally Alschuler, supra note 67.
105. See, e.g., State v. Box, 17 P.3d 386,391 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).
106. See, e.g., State v. Tolsdorf, 574 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Iowa 1998). But see
State v. Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 102-03 (Minn. 2000) (finding that where police allow
the arrestee to return to the car as "a courtesy, not an exigency," they may not search
incident to the arrest; this rule "encourages officers to follow normal police protocol and
to not allow vehicles, and the weapons or evidence they may contain, to come within the
arrestee's immediate control during the arrest").
107. The Court was certainly aware of this. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 n.6
("Because of this disposition of the case, there is no need here to consider whether the
search and seizure were permissible under the so-called 'automobile exception. '") (citing
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United Statcs, 267 U.S. 132
(1925».
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Belton, the Court extended Carroll to allow searches of closed
containers found in the car. \08 It would seem that, after smelling burnt
marijuana and seeing the envelope marked "Supergold," the trooper had
probable cause to believe there was marijuana in the car-anywhere in
the car, including Belton's jacket (and, perhaps, even the trunk!).l09
Instead, the Court expanded the search incident to arrest doctrine far
beyond its rationale, thereby breaking faith with the fundamental
principle that "the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate
with the rationale that· excepts the search from the warrant
requirement"l1°-and sowing a bit of havoc in the lower courts. 111
Now that both the "Belton car-search-incident-to-arrest" doctrine
and the "automobile exception" are the law, the resulting combined rule
a police officer must follow is this: "If I lawfully arrest a 'recent'
occupant of a car, I may 'contemporaneously' search the passenger
compartment-but not the trunk, unless I have 'probable cause' to
believe there is evidence or contraband in the trunk, in which case I may
search the trunk even if no arrestee 'recently' occupied the car." After
getting over his bewilderment as to what valid interests are protected by
such a strange, complex rule, the officer then must guess at what
"recent," "contemporaneous," and "probable" mean-and then apply
the correct rule to the correct part of the automobile. And this rule was
imposed by a Supreme Court that was supposedly trying to help the
police by establishing a "bright line,,!112
II. LOWER COURT REACTIONS
When lower courts believe that they are bound by a rule that does
not hold up to its own rationale, one can expect conflict and confusion.
108. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; see also Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579-80; Rudstein,
supra note 85, at 261:
The Court's holding in United States v. Ross grants law enforcement
personnel significant authority to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles and their contents upon probable cause, thereby undermining
what was perhaps the true reason for its holding in Belton. Because of this,
the Court should now reconsider its decision in Belton.
109. On remand, this is just what the New York Court of Appeals held: "[I]n
light of the discovery of the marihuana-filled envelope on the car floor and the odor of
the substance, there clearly was reason to believe that the automobile might contain other
drugs." People v. Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745,748 (1982).
110. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973).
Ill. See infra text accompanying notes 155-77.
112. See supra note 95; see also Robert A. Stern, Comment, Robbins v.
California and New York v. Belton: The Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to Container
Searches, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 291, 313 (1982) ("The 'bright line' rule merely
substitutes new problems for old ones. ").
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This is just what has happened in cases applying the search incident to
arrest doctrine to areas in the home and to areas in a car.

A. Home Searches
When the arrest has taken place in a home or hotel, many courts
take a "time of the arrest" approach, holding that Chimel permits a
search of the area within the arrestee's reach at the time of the arresteven if, at the time of the search, the arrestee had been restrained or
even removed from the area. But a few other courts take a "realistic"
approach, carefully examining whether the arrestee could in fact have
reached into the area at the time of the search.
A leading example of the "time of the arrest" group is United
States v. Turner.113 Police obtained a warrant to arrest Turner for
distributing cocaine and for a firearms offense. 1I4 They found him in an
apartment, in bed. 115 They arrested him, finding a gun under the
sheets. 1I6 Next, they handcuffed him and took him to a second room.l17
Then they searched the first room, finding some baggies of cocaine. 118
Finding the search was valid, the court applied a two-part test: (1) was
the searched area within the arrestee's control when he was arrested,
and (2) did events occurring thereafter make the search unreasonable?1I9
The answer to the first question was clearly yes. 120 The Turner court's
answer to the second question is thus:
Next we consider whether subsequent events made the
search unreasonable. The officers handcuffed Turner and took
him into the next room out of a concern for safety. We cannot
say that these concerns were unfounded, for they had already
discovered a concealed weapon beneath the bedding. They did
not take him far away or delay for long before conducting the
search. Under the circumstances, we cannot find the search
that revealed the baggies of cocaine inconsistent with

Chimel. 121

113. 926 F.2d 883 (9th CiT. 1991).
114. See id. at 885.
115. [d. at 885-86.
116. [d. at 886.
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. [d. at 887-88.
120. [d. at 888.
121. [d.
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This reasoning is troubling. The court correctly held that it was
reasonable for the police to handcuff Turner and remove him from the
room to prevent him from reaching another weapon he might use to
attack the police, but why does this make the subsequent search of that
room "reasonable"? Is the Chimel doctrine part of a game-by validly
arresting Turner in a room, the police "won the right" to search the
room, and they shouldn't "lose that right" because they removed Turner
from the room for a good reason?122 This overlooks the fact that once
Turner was removed from the room there was no need to search the
room without a warrant.
The notion that the Fourth Amendment merely establishes the rnles
of a game seemed to underlie the holding in United States v. AbdulSaboor,123 where the court upheld a search in the defendant's apartment,
agreeing with the government's contention that "the determination of
immediate control must be made when the arrest occurs. ,,124
[I]f the courts were to focus exclusively upon the moment of
the search, we might create a perverse incentive for an
arresting officer to prolong the period during which the
arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a danger to the
officer. That danger is not necessarily terminated by the
arrest. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Belton responding
to an analogous argument, "no search or seizure incident to a
lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid [if] by seizing an
article . . . an officer may be said to have reduced that article
to his 'exclusive control"'-and thus to have ended the
defendant's control. Likewise if by arresting and securing the
defendant, an officer may be said to have put the area where
the arrest took place under his own control-and thus outside
the arrestee's "exclusive control"-then, the law would truly
be, asMr. Bumble said, "a ass. ,,125
122. See State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Iowa 1917):
There is no rule which demands the suspect be given a sporting chance to get
to destructible evidence or deadly weapons before the officer is able to find
them. We hold the police may see to the safe custody and security of
suspects first and then make the limited search which the circumstances of
the particular case permit.
123. 85 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
124. [d. at 668.
125. [d. at 669 (citation omitted). This approach might have been unnecessary.
On the peculiar facts of Abdul-Saboor, the court might have held that this was one of
those unusual situations where the arrestee might have been able to reach a weapon at
the time of the search: "Abdul-Saboor had specifically requested entry to the area
searched [to get some clothes]; once there, he seized and attempted to hide a loaded
handgun." [d. at 670.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

684

Peculiar reasoning. Because the court does not trust the good faith
of the police officer, it gives the officer authority to search more of the
arrestee's home than he needs to in order to protect himself. (What do
you make of that, Mr. Bumble?) In addition, the court relies on a quote
from Belton (a car case, not a home case) that has always puzzled me.
The quoted language seems to say that if a rule does not comport with
its rationale, then the rationale-not the rule-must be wrong!
Belton was invoked again in State v. Murdock,126 where the
defendant was arrested in his apartment. 127 The majority allowed a
search of the area around him at the time of the arrest-relying in part
on Belton's quest for "bright lines":
Accordingly, we conclude that the Chimel standard
authorizes a contemporaneous, limited search of the area
immediately surrounding the arrestee measured at the time of
the arrest without consideration to actual accessibility to the
area searched. This is a simple, practical rule. Its sanction of
a contemporaneous, limited search protects the individual's
privacy interests in areas outside his or her immediate control
and also serves valid societal interests in protecting officer
safety and preserving evidence. 128
A dissenting justice disagreed: "I do not believe a car and a home can be
equated in search and seizure law. ,,129 As I indicated earlier, this
statement is certainly supported by the Supreme Court's consistent.
disparate treatment of cars and homes.
In United States v. Tavolacci,130 the court adhered to prior decisions
adopting the "time of arrest" approach, noting: "This is one area of
criminal procedure in which the courts have achieved some degree of
clarity, refraining from any slippery test of actuai necessity. We see no
need to introduce new confusion. ,,131 This sounds like a "bright-line"
justification, but it really isn't. The "time of arrest" approach does not
eliminate the often-difficult task (mandated by Chimel) of determining
how far the arrestee could reach-it simply poses that question at the
time of arrest rather than the time of the search. It is no more clear and
no less "slippery" than a "time of search" approach, but it is less

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

155 Wis. 2d 217,455 N.W.2d 618 (1990).
Id. at 222,455 N.W.2d at 619.
Id. at 236,455 N.W.2d at 626.
Id. at 238,455 N.W.2d at 627 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
895 F.2d 1423 (D.C. CiT. 1990).
Id. at 1429.

2002:657

Empirical Reexamination of Chimel

685

consistent with the rationale for allowing a search incident to arrest at
all.
Some courts have allowed the police to search the area around a
handcuffed arrestee who has not been removed from the place of arrest.
In People v. Hufnagel,132 the court justified such a ruling: "[S]ince
handcuffs can fail, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
area the arrestee could reach after breaking free from them. ,,133 The
court cited no studies showing that handcuffs fail with any frequency,
and the literature I received from various police departments suggests
that officers take careful precautions to ensure that they do not fail. 134
The possibility of handcuffs failing seems a thin reed on which to rest a
general rule allowing a warrantless search of a home-particularly since
the police can (and usually do) remove the arrestee from the area after
handcuffing him.
Normally, if the police choose not to remove a handcuffed arrestee
from the area of arrest, they demonstrate their own belief that the
handcuffs and presence of officers will prevent the arrestee from
reaching into the area. I can, I suppose, think of situations where this
might not be so. Perhaps a single officer has arrested several suspects
and feels that it is not safe to remove the suspects until back-up officers
arrive (though one wonders why it would be safer for the officer to
search the area instead of keeping his eye on the suspects). Or perhaps
the officer has reason to fear that friends of the arrestee might reach for
a weapon while the officer is securing the arrestee. 135 Or maybe the
arrestee is struggling and resisting application of handcuffs. 136 If a court
is persuaded that one of these unusual situations is present, then the area
search should be allowed.
While many courts rule as Turner and Abdul-Saboor did,137 a few
courts take a more "realistic" approach. In People v. Summers,138 the
132. 745 P.2d.242 (Colo. 1987).
133. Id. at 247.
134. See supra Part I.A.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 908 F.2d 189, 193 (7th Cir. 1990).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51,55 (6th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424, 427 (lOth Cir. 1971).
137. E.g., Watkins, 564 F.2d at 205:
It is true, as Appellant contends, that Appellant had been subdued and
presented no danger to the police at the time the suitcase was opened. Nor
was there the possibility that the evidence in the suitcase would be destroyed
as the suitcase was under the control of the police. However, the authority
to conduct a search incident to an arrest, once established, still exists even
after the need to disarm and prevent the destruction of evidence have been
dispelled.
id.; see also In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("The
critical time for analysis, however, is the time of the arrest and not the time of the
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majority stated: "where there is no threat to the officers because the
suspect has been immobilized, removed; and no one else is present, it
makes no sense that the place he was removed from remains subject to
search merely because he was previously there. ,,139 A concurring
opinion disagreed: "The right to search attaches at the moment of arrest.
I am not offended, the federal courts are not offended, and most
importantly the Constitution is not offended by allowing police to delay
exercise of that right until they can do so safely. ,,140 Others, however,
might well be "offended" by a rule that fails to conform to its own
rationale.
In Stackhouse v. State,141 a police officer arrested Stackhouse in the
attic of his home, then took him down to the second floor and
handcuffed him.142 The officer then returned to the attic and searched it,
finding a shotgun barrel. 143 The court held that the search was not
justified by the search incident to arrest doctrine:
First is the question of whether the search is justified
under Chimel as within the area of appellant's reach or grasp.

search."); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1990); Davis v.
Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Under the circumstances prevailing at the
time of the plaintiffs arrest, including Davis' immediate proximity to the loaded rifle
which was in clear view and easily accessible to him, the police were lawfully entitled to
seize the rifle after having placed the plaintiff into the squad car. "); United States v.
Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wright, 577 F.2d 378,
380 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kaye, 492 F.2d 744, 746 (6th Cir. 1974):
Appellant's suitcase was within that area at the time of his arrest. It is true,
as Appellant contends, that Appellant had been subdued and presented no
danger to the police at the time the suitcase was opened. Nor was there the
possibility that the evidence in the suitcase would be destroyed as the
suitcase was under the control of the police. However, the authority to
conduct a search incident to an arrest, once established, still exists even after
the need to disarm and prevent the destruction of evidence have been
dispelled.
id.; State v. Noles, 546 P.2d 814, 817-18 (Ariz. 1976); People v. Fitzpatrick, 300
N.E.2d 499, 508 (N. Y. 1973) ("[T]he fact that the police had handcuffed the defendant
did not render the closet search unauthorized . . . it is not at all clear that the' grabbing
distance' authorized in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the arrested person's
continued capacity 'to grab'. "). In addition, several other Ninth Circuit cases have
followed Turner. See United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tarazon,
989 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 1993).
138. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999).
139. [d. at 390.
140. [d. at 393 (Bedsworth, J., concurring).
141. 468 A.2d 333 (Md. 1983).
142. [d. at 336.
143. [d.
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We hold that it was not. Appellant was out of the attic and
handcuffed; therefore, it cannot be argued that, from the floor
below, the area of the attic was within his grasp. 144
A number of other cases agree with this approach, examining whether
the searched area was within the arrestee's reach at the time of the
search rather than at the time of arrest. 145 Courts using this approach
almost never uphold the search under the search incident to arrest
doctrine. 146 This is to be expected, of course, because police officers
are not fools. As the answers to my inquiries revealed, they will
normally restrain and remove the arrestee from the scene of arrest as
soon as possible in order to protect themselves.
144. [d. at 342.
145. See, e.g., United States v. McConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321,330 (D.C. Cir. 1983):
The search of the closet in the instant case clearly was beyond the pale
demarcated by Chimei and its progeny. At the time of the search, Lyons
was sitting, handcuffed, on a chair near the doorway. Inside the room were
six police officers, at least four of whom presumably were armed. The
closet was located at the far end of the wall adjacent to that in which the
doorway was located-several yards away from Lyons. Under these
circumstances, it is inconceivable that Lyons could have gained access to the
area.
id.; United States v. Cueto, 611 F.2d 1056,1062 (5th Cir. 1980):
At the time the search was made Cueto and Bavosa were both handcuffed
and subdued; the record suggests that they had already been removed from
the room. The defendants. were certainly in no position to reach concealed
weapons or to grab and destroy evidence in the suitbag or between the
mattresses.
id.; United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]he seizure
cannot be sanctioned as a search incident to arrest. Appellant was shackled to Sansone
on a bed and the billfold was clearly out of his reach or immediate control. "); United
States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The record in this case reveals that
the closet in which the heroin packages were found was closed at the time of search. ");
United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103, 105 (lOth Cir. 1969) ("[I]t cannot be said that the
inside of his bureau drawers, night stand, under the bed or any similar area was under
any type of control by Baca inasmuch as he was handcuffed with his hands behind his
back and was unable even to dress himself. "); State v. Cook, 332 S.E.2d 147, 155 (W.
Va. 1985):
[W]here the three arrestees, two of them handcuffed, were apparently seated
on a bed with one or more shotguns pointed at them, the arresting officer's
search of the top of the dresser outside of the area of their physical control
was clearly unnecessary under either the law enforcement safety or
protection of evidence rationales for both the "incident to a valid arrest" and
"plain view" doctrines.
146. Well, hardly ever. See Voelkel v. State, 629 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982) ("It is not unreasonable to expect that Ms. Voelkel, although frontally
handcuffed, could have obtained a weapon or destroyed evidence in the clothing bag and
cigarette case. H).

688

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

In United States v. Griffith,147 officers arrested Griffith in his room
but did not restrain him: "They did not handcuff him, and they allowed
him to walk about the room to get dressed instead of bringing his clothes
to him." 148 The court apparently suspected that the officers had the
"perverse motive" alluded to above in United States v. Abdul-Saboor,
but this led to the opposite conclusion:
If the freedom thus permitted defendant created the
danger that he would walk within reach of the brown paper
sack-and the record does not even show that it did-the
danger was of the officers' own making. Just as "Chimel does
not permit the arresting officers to lead the accused from place
to place and use his presence in each location to justify a
'search incident to the arrest,'" it does not permit the officers
to achieve the same result by ordering the accused to dress and
then not bringing him his clothes, thus requiring him to move
about the room in order to comply with their directions. The
officers' only legitimate purpose in being in the room was to
make an arrest. They did not have the right to create a
situation which gave them a pretext for searching beyond the
area of defendant's immediate control. The officers could
have handed him whatever clothes he needed in order to dress.
They could then have posted a guard on the room, obtained a
search warrant, and later returned to search the room pursuant
to the warrant. 149
. .

Somehow, I doubt that Mr. Bumble would characterize this sensible
reasoning as "a ass."
Occasionally, of course, the police may have good reason not to
restrain or remove the arrestee immediately (e.g., where the arrestee
needs to obtain some clothes), and here the police should be allowed to
search the area he might reach into. ISO But this exceptional situation
should not be the basis for a general rule allowing the search of an area
of the home incident to the arrest. On occasion, the police might not
restrain the arrestee simply because they do not fear him for some
reason (e.g., reputation, age, or disability). If they do not fear that he
might reach into an area for a weapon or evidence, it makes little sense
to allow them to search that area anyway.
147. 537 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1976).
148. [d. at 904.
149. [d. (citation omitted).
150. Courts have had no trouble allowing a search in this situation. See, e.g.,
Watkins, 564 F.2d at 205; Jones, 767 P.2d at 238.
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Which approach-the "time of arrest" approach or the "time of
search" approach-is correct? As I've indicated above, I believe that the
"time of search" approach more correctly follows the traditional
principle that a doctrine that permits warrantless searches must be based
on a sound rationale. But which approach is the "correct" interpretation
of Chimel? Are the "time of arrest" cases aberrations that do not really
understand Chimel (or are deliberately trying to extend it past its
rationale)? It might be hard to call them "aberrations," as they seem to
make up the majority approach in the lower courts (though I haven't
done a complete count). But do they correctly interpret Chimel? This is
a difficult question.
The language used in Chimel is not clear on this point.
Immediately after saying that the police may search the, person of the
arrestee, the Court stated:
[T]he area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab
a weapon or evidentiary items'must, of course, be governed by
a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one
who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. lSI
On the one hand, one could say that this language supports the
"time of search" approach. Because it permits searches into "the area
into which an arrestee might reach,'~ an area search is permitted only
when the "gun on a table or in a drawer;' is "dangerous to the arresting
officer," and only if the arrestee can in fact reach it at the time of the
search. IS2
But on the other hand, because in the real world this is hardly ever
a serious possibility at the time of, the search, such an interpretation
would effectively eviscerate Chimel's positive rule (insofar as it applies
to area searches). Arguably, the Supreme Court did not intend to
151. Chimel, 395 U.s. at 763.
152. This is not the only way to read Chimel. Professor Bradley apparently read
it to support the "time of arrest" approach:
'
[T]he Chimel Court also allows warrantless, no-probable-cause searches for
evidence of areas within the "immediate control" of the arrestee, apparently
without regard to whether the arrest is for an offense that could produce
evidence or whether the arrestee in the instant case actually has a capacity to
'
grab for anything.
Bradley, supra note 67, at 451. Professor Bradley went on to criticize Chimel:
[T]he Court should not permit a search for weapons unless there is an
immediate danger that cannot be diffused by less intrusive means, such as
handcuffing the suspect, and warrantless searches for evidence, should be
forbidden absent both probable cause and exigent circumstances.
[d. at 452.
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announce a rule only to have lower courts hold that it rarely applies. 153
Arguably, the Supreme Court did not intend its ruling to be
meaningless, and lower courts are not empowered to undercut such a
ruling in a way that makes it meaningless. Arguably, like it or not, to
be faithful to Chimel, lower courts must adopt the "time-of-arrest"
approach. And it now seems clear than many lower courts will continue
to do just that-until the Supreme Court cures this problem by clarifying
(or disapproving) Chimel's positive rule insofar as it applies to area
searches.

B. Car Searches
If Chimel created confusion, Belton begat bedlam. Here is the
difficulty. While suspects arrested at home are occasionally allowed to
remain in the place of arrest during the search, this almost never
happens to suspects arrested in a car. I have read many reported
decisions on car searches, and I have yet to see a case where this has
happened. 154 This is understandable. As one court acknowledged, "[i]t
seems quite likely that, in instances where occupants of a car are
arrested, they will be outside the car and will have been placed under
some measure of security before the car is searched. ,,155 The materials
sent to me by various police departments show that it would be quite
dangerous for an officer to assume the awkward positions needed to
search a car while an unrestrained suspect is close by. Officers are
instructed to remove the suspect from the car before beginning the
search. Thus, in virtually every case, a search of a car incident to an
arrest will involve an arrest of a former occupant of the car. As one
court put it, after the arrest of an occupant of a car, "his wingspan had
been clipped and his grabbable area was a police cruiser rather than his

153. As noted above, the majority in Belton said something very similar in
rejecting defendant's argument that the police may not use the search incident to arrest
doctrine to justify the search of an object they have seized from the grabbable area:
"[N]o search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid; by
seizing an article even on the arrestee's person, an officer may be said to have reduced
that article to his 'exclusive control' [-and thus to have ended the defendant's control]."
453 U.S. at 462 n.5.
154. There are, however, a handful of cases where the officer might have planned
to allow the arrestee to return to the car. See, e.g., United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d
665,668-69 (7th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803,817-18 (7th Cir. 1997). Following Belton, however,
the Karlin and Sholola courts went on to hold that the search of the car of the restrained·
and removed arrestee was justified by the search incident to arrest doctrine. Karlin, 852
F.2d at 971-72; Sholola, 124 F.3d at 818.
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own vehicle. ,,156 Nevertheless, lower courts have rather consistently
ruled that Belton allows a search of the car incident to the arrest of an
occupant who was not in or near the car at the time of the search. 157
Belton allowed a search of the car "contemporaneous" with the
arrest of a "recent occupant" of the. car.
But what do
"contemporaneous" and "recent" mean? These terms are vague, but
lawyers, judges, and police officers applying the Fourth Amendment are
used to dealing with vague terms: "probable cause," "reasonable
suspicion, " "justifiable expectation of privacy, " and "voluntary
consent," to name a few. These terms can be interpreted by applying
the policy behind them. "Probable cause" is the balance point between
the individual's need for privacy and the government's need to find
evidence relating to crime. "Reasonabl,e suspicion" is the balance point
between the individual's liberty of movement and the government's need
to investigate people who might have committed, or who will commit, a
crime. Tough to do, but doable. But what is the policy behind
"contemporaneous" and "recent occupant"? With no guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts have been left to their own devices to find
one.
In United States v. Cotton,158 the court came up with this rationale
for allowing the search of a car after the arrestee has been removed and
restrained:
The facts surrounding each arrest are unique and it is not by
any means inconceivable under those various possibilities that
an arrestee could gain control of some item within the
automobile. The law simply does not require the arresting
officer to mentally sift through all these possibilities during an
156. State v. Gonzalez, 487 N.W.2d 567,570 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992).
157. See, e.g., Rudstein, supra note 80, at 246:
In a significant number of cases courts have upheld searches on the basis of
Belton even though the arrestee was sitting in a police cruiser-in some cases
even handcuffed-when the police searched the passenger compartment of
his vehicle or a container found therein. Courts have reached the same
result in cases in which the arrestee, although not in a squad car, was either
handcuffed or restrained in some other manner by police officers at the time
of the search. Yet, in none of these cases can it realistically be said that the
arrestee could have reached into the passenger compartment, or a container
located therein, in order to grab a weapon or to destroy or conceal evidence.
To argue otherwise is to engage upon a flight of fancy.
More recent cases have done the same. See Statev. Greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 4142 (Nev. 1993) (Steffen, 1., dissenting) (summarizing cases); see also United
States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 825-26 (I Ith Cir. 1996); Gonzalez, 487 N.W.2d
at 571; Pack v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 921,922-23 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
158. 751 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985).
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arrest, before deciding whether he may lawfully search within
the vehicle.
The evolution of the law regarding the warrantless
searches of automobiles has of necessity followed a different
path than that of searches incident to lawful arrest in general.
The arrestee may have hidden, within the close proximity of
the car interior, either weapons or contraband which are easily
obtainable. He also has a significantly lessened privacy
interest in the objects found within the car than he would in
objects found within his home. 159

True, it is not "inconceivable" that an arrestee could gain access to
the car at the time of the search, but these would be very unusual
circumstances. 160 Certainly they would not be the norm, as the materials
sent to me by various police departments (as well as common sense)
show: for officer safety, get the guy away from the car before you
search it! It seems strange to create a general rule applicable to all
arrests of car occupants based on a situation that one may "conceive"
only with substantial effort. This is not how the law operates in an
analogous area: courts do not permit a frisk for weapons during a Terry
stop where the officer has no reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed and dangerous-even though it is "conceivable" that such a
suspect might carry a weapon. 161
Cotton's second rationale, the "lessened privacy interest" in a car,
is relevant, but as the Supreme Court held in Ross and Acevedo, it is not
sufficient by itself to justify the search of a car. "Lessened" is not the
same as "none" -one does retain some privacy interest in a car and the
objects one places in it, and for this reason the "automobile exception"
requires the officer to have probable cause to believe there is evidence
of a crime in the car in order to search it (though he does not need
exigent circumstances preventing him from getting a search warrant).
Some courts have held that an arrestee was a "recent occupant" of
a car if he was in the car when the police first "initiated contact" with
him. 162 In People v. Savedra,163 the Supreme Court of Colorado
proposed a rationale for this distinction:

159. [d. at 1148.

160. But see supra notes 106-07.
161. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64
(1968); People v. Rivera, 650 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); People v.
Morgan, 484 N.E.2d 1292, 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Simpler v. State, 568 A.2d 22,
27 (Md. 1990).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Hudgins, 52 F.3d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. State, 761 So.
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Prior to police contact, one of the occupants could have chosen
to hide something in the vehicle to avoid discovery by the
police. If Belton were read to preclude a search in this
situation where police contact occurred just after the suspect
exited his vehicle, then knowledgeable suspects could
effectively conceal evidence by stepping outside of their
vehicle whenever they saw a police officer approaching. 164
An admirable effort, but the court asks us to accept a general rule
by assuming that the average criminal would be "knowledgeable" about
Belton ,and about lower court cases interpreting it, and also
"knowledgeable" about the "automobile exception," inventory searches,
and other legal doctrines that might permit a search of the car whether
he exited the car or not. Quite a stretch. I can't assume that my law
students are "knowledgeable" about all of this after a full semester of
studying these cases!
Other courts hold that Belton allows the search of a car even when
police did not "initiate contact" until after the suspect left the car.165 In
Glasco v. Commonwealth, police arrested Glasco (for driving with a
suspended license) after he had parked the car and began walking
away.166 Police then searched the car, and the court upheld the search:

2d lOW, 1013 (Fla. 1999); State v. Foster, 905 P.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Idaho Ct. App.
1995) (discussing cases related to a search incident to arrest).
163. 907 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1995).
164. Id. at 600. The court then quoted a Nebraska opinion:
In order to conduct a valid search, police officers should not have to race
from their vehicles to the arrestee's vehicle to prevent the arrestee from
getting out of his or her vehicle. If this were the rule, the quick and the
speedy suspect could always create a sanctuary for weapons or contraband
by getting out of the vehicle and surrendering to the officer first.
Id. (citing Gonzalez, 487 N.W.2d at 572). A recent Colorado case viewed the situation
more realistically-but nevertheless felt bound to do the wrong thing (holding' that a
search of the car incident to the arrest of the driver was valid even though the driver was
handcuffed and being driven to the police station in a patrol car when the search began):
Here, ... there was no possibility that defendant could obtain a weapon or
destroy evidence once he was in the police car, and thus, the very bases for a
search incident to arrest appear not to have been present. Nevertheless, as
noted, the [Colorado] [S]upreme [C]ourt cases have emphasized the
importance of the temporal proximity between the police encounter and the
defendant's presence in the vehicle, irrespective of the defendant's location
at the time of the vehicle search.
People v. Graham, No. 99CA2314, 2001 Colo. App. LEX IS 1610, at *8 (Colo. Ct.
App. Sept. 27, 2001).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Snook, 88 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1996).
166. 513 S.E.2d 137, 140 (Va. 1999).
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[W]e are not persuaded by the authorities that have decided
that an arrestee is an. occupant or recent occupant of an
automobile only if the police officer initiates contact with the
arrestee before that person exits the vehicle. That kind of
limitation assumes that an individual, who voluntarily gets out
of an automobile, is not aware of the presence of a police
officer, or having such knowledge, it did not prompt the
person to exit the vehicle. We do not. believe that those
assumptions
are
always
warranted.
Moreover,
a
knowledgeable suspect has the same motive and opportunity to
destroy evidence or obtain a weapon as the arrestee with whom
a police officer has initiated contact. That suspect could also
conceal evidence in the vehicle and effectively prevent an
officer from discovering it by getting out of his or her
automobile. 167

Granted, those assumptions might not "always" be warranted, but it
seems odd· to allow a warrantless search in many cases merely because it
might be justified in a few. As a concurring judge reasoned in Glasco,
"the mere ability of a citizen to put evidence out of the reach of law
enforcement by placing it within an area protected by the right to
privacy is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search. "168
Belton's requirement that the search be "contemporaneous" with
the arrest also seems to have baffled the lower federal courts. In United
States v. Vasey,169 the Ninth Circuit held that thirty to forty-five minutes
was too long to be "contemporaneous, ,,170 while in United States v.

167. [d. at 141-42; see also State v. Wanzek, 598 N.W.2d 811,815 (N.D. 1999).
[T]hese decisions raise grave public policy issues because they create serious
concerns for the safety of officers and others. By drawing a distinction
between an occupant and a recent occupant of a vehicle, we would
encourage individuals to avoid lawful searches of their vehicles by rapidly
exiting or moving away from the vehicle as officers approached. Police
officers should not have to race from their vehicles to the arrestee's vehicle
to prevent the arrestee from getting out of the vehicle in order to conduct a
valid search. If Belton is read to preclude· searches where police contact
occurs after the suspect exits the vehicle, suspects could conceal evidence
and weapons by merely stepping outside the vehicle whenever they saw an
officer approaching.
[d. (citations omitted).
168. 513 S.E.2d at 145 (Lacy, 1., concurring). Justice Lacy also argued: "If
there is no connection shown between a person's occupancy of a vehicle and his arrest,
then extending the scope of the search incident to arrest to the vehicle is neither 'tied to'
nor 'justified by' circumstances of the arrest." [d. at 144.
169. 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987).
170. [d. at 787.
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McLaughlin,171 the Ninth Circuit held that five minutes was finebecause the officer used that five minutes to complete paperwork
relating to impounding defendant's car, and thus "the search in this case
occurred during a continuous series of events closely connected in time
to the arrest.,,172 But why should this matter? Whether forty-five
minutes, five minutes, or one minute, if the arrestee has been restrained
and moved to a place where he can no longer reach the car before the
search, what justifies the search? If the rationale for allowing the search
is a mystery, then defining "contemporaneous"-as a matter of Fourth
Amendment policy-is a futile quest. Concurring in McLaughlin, Judge
Trott voiced his frustration:
So the law regarding searches incident to arrest now reads
something like, "well, thirty-minutes is too long, but five
minutes is okay and you can delay if you are filling out
paperwork but not if you are interrogating or transporting the
defendant." So much for bright lines.
The tragedy is not just that the rule is now so unclear that
it provides little guidance to law enforcement. Of greater
concern is the reality that the search incident to arrest
exception has been completely severed from the historic
rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence. The
questions now revolve around when and how, not why.
The case before us illustrates this perfectly. McLaughlin
was pulled over for having an illegally tinted rear window. He
was then arrested because the police discovered there was an
outstanding warrant for failure to appear. The search in no
way furthered officer safely [sic]: McLaughlin was handcuffed
and taken away.
There was no evidence to preserve.
Analytically-given the evaporation of the inventory search
basis-the search was a fishing expedition-a purely
exploratory search-plain and simple. 173
Judge Trott concluded by noting "the absurdity associated with allowing
purely exploratory searches incident to arrest. Cessante ratione legis
cessat et ipsa lex. ['The reason for the law ceasing, the law also
ceases. ']"174 I could not have put it better myself.
I don't mean to sound unduly critical of lower federal court
opinions. These judges are doing the best they can to make lemonade
171.
172.
173.
174.

170 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 1999).
[d. at 891.
[d. at 895 (Trott, J., concurring).
[d.
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out of a real lemon. They have no choice but to follow Belton,175 and
they are trying to make some sense of it. As Judge Trott explained so
eloquently, however, it just can't be done.176
III. CONCLUSION

In 1971, the Supreme Court summarized its prior Fourth
Amendment rulings as follows:
Thus the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." The exceptions
are "jealously and carefully drawn," and there must be "a
showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies
of the situation made that course imperative." "[T]he burden
is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it. ,,177
175. Some state courts have simply refused to follow Belton, holding that their
state constitutions or statutes protect privacy more than the Fourth Amendment (as
interpreted by Belton) does. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 180, 184 (Kan.
1996); State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); State v. Brown, 588
N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1992); State v. Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446,448 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
Some courts appeared to ignore Belton rathcr than expressly disapprove it. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1983); Greenwald, 858 P.2d at 36.
The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to apply Beiton to warrantless arrests for motor
vehicle offenses. Pierce, 642 A.2d at 959. See generally Catherine Hancock, State
Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085 (1982); J. Tim
Thomas, Note, Belton Is Not Welcome: Idaho's Rejection and Subsequent Adoption of
the Belton Rule in State v. Charpentier, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 125 (1998).
176. As Professor Alschuler put it, "when the rule is artificial, delimiting its
boundary becomes a matter of guesswork." Alschuler, supra note 62, at 231; see also
id. at 285 ("[N]onsense is likely to yield nonsense, and nonsense rules are likely to
prove difficult to apply. "). In his dissent in People v. Brosnan, 298 N.E.2d 78, 86
(N.Y. 1973), Judge Wachtler stated: "[S]earch and seizure law [becomes] uncontrollable
when the rubric [is] adopted and the rationale discarded."
For a summary of the confusion among lower courts applying Belton before 1987,
see David M. Silk, Comment, When Bright Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v.
Belton, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 281 (1987). The comment concludes:
Thcse decisions, of course, demonstrate a fundamental failure of the Belton
rule. Different courts have used the reasoning of the Belton decision-the
need to create a workable bright line rule-to find support for directly
conflicting results. In this area, Belton fails to guide police conduct, fails to
provide citizens with an idea of the scope of their rights, and fails to ensure
consistent results.
Id. at 300.
177. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (footnotes
omitted).
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It may well be that the· force of this statement has been diluted
somewhat by decisions rendered by the Court since 1971. Nevertheless,
Therefore, any
the Court has remained faithful to its essence.
"exception" to the "warrant requirement" should at least not be
arbitrary. It should be based on some real need to search.
Is there anything about the fact of an arrest qua arrest that tends to
justify a search? Well, yes. An arrest is often a traumatic event for a
suspect. One moment he is free, and the next moment he is in the
custody of the police. And he might realize that this custody can turn
into a lengthy prison term if the police obtain more evidence to convict
or add further charges. In this emotional state, the arrestee might seek
to harm the arresting officers in order to escape, and he might try to
dispose of any evidence that might enhance this likelihood of conviction
or lead to further charges. But the police are neither stupid nor helpless.
They can and will prevent these actions-first and foremost by
restraining and removing the suspect from any area that might contain a
weapon or evidence. If they arrest him in his home, they will handcuff
him and remove him from the home. If they arrest him in a car, they
will remove him from the car and then handcuff him. Common sense
tells us this, and the police themselves tell us that this is what they in
fact do. There might be occasional exceptions. 178 But if the Court
honors its purported commitment to the Fourth Amendment even
slightly, it should form its general rule based on what the police
normally do, not on the exceptions.
In sum, the fact of custodial arrest should allow the police to search
the clothing the arrestee is wearing, but not the area around him, unless
particular and unusual facts justify such a search. The Court should
reexamine Chimel and Belton.

178. See supra notes 18, 106-07, 155.

